Climate policy, interconnection and carbon leakage: the effect of unilateral UK policy on electricity and GHG emissions in Ireland by John, Curtis et al.
  
Climate policy, interconnection and carbon leakage: the effect of 
unilateral UK policy on electricity and GHG emissions in Ireland 
John Curtis,ab* Valeria Di Cosmo,ab Paul Deanec 
Abstract: This paper examines the effect on Ireland’s Single Electricity Market (SEM) 
of the UK’s unilateral policy to implement a carbon price floor for electricity 
generation based on fossil-fuel.  We simulate electricity markets and find that, 
subject to efficient use of the interconnectors between the two markets, a carbon 
price floor will lead to carbon leakage, with associated emissions in the Republic of 
Ireland increasing by 8% and SEM’s electricity prices increasing by 2.4%.  As the 
carbon price floor does not affect the number of ETS allowances no change is 
anticipated in aggregate European emissions. We also find that the EU’s proposal to 
postpone ETS allowance auctions will reduce Irish emissions somewhat but that the 
trade opportunities associated with the UK carbon price floor means that emissions 
reductions in Ireland will be lower than might have been otherwise.  A carbon price 
floor will result in substantial tax revenues and had the carbon price floor been 
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significant negative welfare and competitiveness effects. 
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Climate policy, interconnection and carbon leakage: the effect of 
unilateral UK policy on electricity and GHG emissions in Ireland 
1. Introduction 
The European Union’s energy policy envisages open and competitive energy markets in 
electricity and gas, maintaining secure energy supplies at the lowest possible cost [CEC 
(2011)].  Efficient, integrated, and fluid energy markets in Europe are also integral to making 
the transition to a low-carbon economy [CEC (2012a)].  Among the actions being implemented 
to achieve these goals is the EU third energy package, which comprises regulations on access 
to electricity and gas networks and directives concerning common rules for the internal 
markets in gas and electricity.  The mechanisms implementing these new internal energy 
markets are, for the most part, to be completed by 2014.  But the European Commission fears 
that that deadline will not be met, as Member States are slow in adjusting their national 
legislation and in some instances are engaging in inward-looking or nationally inspired policies 
[CEC (2012a)].  One member state policy that could be considered inward looking is Great 
Britain’s carbon price floor [HM Treasury (2010)].  While the policy is nominally consistent 
with EU aspirations for a low carbon economy, it overrides the EU’s own proposals to support 
the price of carbon within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and additionally it 
disregards the potential for carbon leakage to adjacent countries.  This paper uses Great 
Britain’s carbon price floor (CPF) and its impact on the Single Electricity Market (SEM) for the 
island of Ireland to demonstrate the impact of unilateral energy policy on interconnected 
markets, discussing the intertwined issues of carbon pricing, electricity interconnection 
capacity, and carbon leakage.   
The price of carbon is the market signal that will drive investment in renewable energy and 
help in the transition to a low carbon economy.  However, the current low price for carbon, in 
the absence of alternative subsidies, is not supportive of investment in renewable energy and 
hence the policy efforts within the EU, Great Britain and elsewhere to support the price of 
carbon.  Interconnection between electricity markets facilitates greater penetration of 
intermittent generation on the electricity network but interconnection also enables carbon 
leakage, particularly if policies relating to the price of carbon are misaligned across countries.  
Under Great Britain’s CPF carbon will be more expensive than in adjoining member states 
making electricity generation more competitive outside of Great Britain.   
One of the objectives of this paper is to illustrate that unilateral climate policies have the 
potential to cause perverse outcomes through carbon leakage.  Specifically, we use a model of 
the electricity markets in Ireland and Great Britain (GB) to show that GB’s CPF will increase 
both electricity prices and greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland.  We also contrast GB’s CPF 
with the EU Commission’s proposal to support ETS allowance prices through the 
postponement of auctions of ETS allowances planned for 2013-2015 [CEC (2012b)].   Not 
surprisingly given the high level of the CPF, we find that the CPF can be very effective in 
decarbonising electricity generation in the UK and Ireland but total emissions within the EU 
ETS will remain unchanged.  The EU’s proposals to postpone allowance auctions may reduce 
emissions initially but over the total period to 2020 total emissions will remain unchanged.  
Given the SEM’s interconnection with the GB electricity market, the decision by the UK 
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government to introduce the CPF poses a dilemma for policy makers in the Republic of Ireland 
(ROI).  We briefly review some of the issues faced by the ROI had it considered implementing 
a CPF in response to the GB's CPF. 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes the policy environment 
within which electricity markets operate.  The analysis focuses on the electricity markets in 
Ireland and Great Britain, which are described in section 3.  Section 4 outlines the modelling 
approach.  Section 5 describes the policy scenarios.  Section 6 presents scenario results and 
discussion.  Section 7 presents some conclusions. 
2. The Policy Context 
A major pillar of the European Union’s (EU) climate policy is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS).  The ETS operates a cap on total greenhouse gas emissions from in excess of 11,000 
factories, power stations, and other installations across all 27 EU member states plus Croatia, 
Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein.  Market trading in emissions allowances establishes a 
price for carbon dioxide, the price of which is intended as an incentive to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and decarbonise the economy.  For most of the history of the ETS, allowances 
have traded at prices significantly below the levels envisaged prior to the implementation of 
the EU ETS and in early 2013 allowances traded at levels below €4 per allowance (equivalent 
to one tonne).  A high price for carbon is widely considered as necessary to drive investment 
in energy efficiency and renewable energy [Clarke et al. (2009); Edenhofer et al. (2009)].  A 
surplus of almost 1 billion allowances has accumulated in the ETS, partly attributable to the 
recession but which is putting downward pressure on price [CEC (2012b)].  The European 
Commission has proposed a number of options to underpin allowance prices, including 
postponing auctions of allowances planned for 2013-2015, as well as reforms of the ETS to 
address the growing structural supply-demand imbalance [CEC (2012b)].  While it is likely that 
the allowance auctions will be postponed, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding how 
that will affect allowance prices and the ultimate impact on emissions.  Point Carbon (2012) 
have projected that ETS allowance prices could double in a scenario in which allowance 
auctions are postponed until the end of the decade. 
The UK Government has unilaterally instituted a much more significant market support for 
climate policy objectives.  Commencing 1st April 2013 the UK will operate a carbon price floor 
(CPF) for fossil-fuel based electricity generation at a rate of approximately Stg£16/tCO2 in 
2013 rising to £30/tCO2 in 2020, and to £70/tCO2 in 2030 [HM Treasury (2011)].  The CPF is 
complementary to the EU ETS and affects the generation sector only. Subject to European 
Commission approval, the UK government intends to exempt electricity generators in 
Northern Ireland (NI) and as such the CPF with only apply in the Great Britain electricity 
market [HM Treasury (2012)].  The objective of the CPF is to provide an incentive to invest in 
low-carbon power generation by providing greater support and certainty regarding the price 
of carbon.  But two prices for carbon within Europe will distort markets.  A GB carbon price 
floor that is likely to be significantly higher than ETS allowance prices will provide an incentive 
to invest in low-carbon generation in the GB electricity market; investment in interconnection 
capacity; and increased electricity generation outside of GB for export into the GB market (i.e. 
carbon leakage).  In the short run within existing interconnection constraints the UK’s 
unilateral policy will provide an incentive for carbon leakage into adjacent markets.   
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Both the EU ETS and the UK’s climate policies affect the electricity market on the island of 
Ireland due to the nature of the electricity market.  SEM is the wholesale electricity market 
operating in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.  Fossil fuel based electricity 
generators in both jurisdictions are regulated under the EU ETS.   Regardless of the NI 
exemption, the CPF will affect electricity generation, emissions, and prices within both ROI 
and NI, as the SEM is interconnected with the GB electricity market, British Electricity 
Transmission and Trading Arrangements (BETTA).  Considering the particular case of the Irish 
and Great Britain electricity markets only (i.e. ignoring other markets), with a higher price for 
carbon in the BETTA market compared to the SEM, generation plant in ROI and NI will be 
dispatched more; consequently there will be more electricity exported into the BETTA market, 
subject to interconnection constraints.  Because the wholesale electricity price in the SEM is 
determined as a pool price rather than through bilateral contracts, the extra demand for 
electricity from the BETTA will result in more expensive plant being dispatched within the 
SEM, which in turn affects the average price.  Accordingly, the UK’s unilateral domestic 
climate policy will affect electricity price, generation and greenhouse gas emissions in both 
the Republic and Northern Ireland.   
Carbon leakage is often defined as a gross outflow usually arising when competitive 
advantage is lost compared with foreign countries and production occurs in the foreign 
countries satisfying domestic demand.  The threat of leakage in electricity markets is quite 
acute because electricity is easily traded via interconnectors.  Computable general equilibrium 
models such as Elliott et al. (2010) suggest that as much as one quarter of emissions 
abatement is offset by leakage.  The concept of negative leakage has also been advocated 
where the taxed sector substitutes away from carbon into capital (e.g. from fossil fuels into 
wind turbines) causing a potential overall net reduction in carbon emissions [Elliott and 
Fullerton (2013); Fullerton et al. (2011)].  Given the long lead times in energy infrastructure 
the potential for negative leakage in the short term is likely to be low. 
3. SEM and BETTA Electricity Markets 
This section briefly describes the SEM and its rules, a detailed description of which can be 
found in SEMO (2012). Since November 2007, Ireland and Northern Ireland are combined in 
the All Island Single Electricity Market.  All electricity generated in Ireland with a capacity 
greater than 10 MW must be sold within the SEM. The SEM is a centralized or gross pool 
market with 48 trading periods per day (24 hours) with the first period at 06:00. Electricity is 
bought and sold through the pool under a market clearing mechanism. Generators receive the 
System Marginal Price (SMP) for their scheduled dispatch quantities, capacity payments for 
their actual availability, and constraint payments for changes in the market schedule due to 
system constraints.  The SMP is the price calculated by the market software for every half 
hour trading period that will cover the cost of meeting the cost of a unit increase in demand in 
the SEM.  Electricity retailers purchasing energy from the pool pay the SMP for each trading 
period, capacity costs, and system charges. The SEM is designed around a single 
unconstrained marginal pricing structure, i.e. the wholesale price determined within the 
market ignores transmission and reserve constraints but respects generator physical abilities. 
The system (wholesale) marginal price is made up of a shadow price component and an uplift 
component. Shadow prices form the basis of the SMP calculation for each half hour trading 
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period.  The shadow price only reflects the cost of supplying an incremental change in 
demand.  Payment of shadow prices only will mean that generator units will not recover the 
full costs of production, as the shadow price does not reflect start up, capital and zero load 
costs.  Fixed costs are remunerated through the uplift component of SMP.  Wind is currently 
modelled as a price taker in the SEM. A price taker cannot set the SMP, it merely receives the 
SMP during the trading period.  
The electricity market in Great Britain, British Electricity Transmission and Trading 
Arrangements (BETTA), is designed to encourage bilateral trading between generators and 
suppliers. As described by Steggals et al. (2011), most of the transactions take place within 
vertically integrated firms, with the system operator (SO) in charge of the balancing market.  
In BETTA’s wholesale market electricity generators and retail suppliers contract directly 
between one another; electricity is then sold in the retail market between the suppliers and 
the final consumers. Final consumers may switch between electricity suppliers incentivising 
price competition between suppliers. 
The market operates on the basis of rolling half hourly slots. Generators are required to 
contract with suppliers at the latest one hour ahead of actual supply ("gate-closure") and to 
declare their final settlement to the SO.  The SO penalises companies that default on their 
contracts. 
Given the nature of a bilateral market, the BETTA market is particularly difficult to model and 
simulate. In this paper, we assume that the bilateral contracts between generators and 
suppliers lead to the same price that emerges from a centrally dispatched market. We also  
assume that the incentives provided by the consumers to the suppliers are strong enough to 
generate an electricity price that minimizes the system costs.  In this paper, we model only 
the BETTA and the SEM markets and exclude from the analysis interconnection flows between 
BETTA and both France or the Netherlands. 
4. Modelling Electricity Markets 
We employ the modelling software, PLEXOS, to solve unit commitment and dispatch 
optimisation within the SEM and BETTA electricity markets.  PLEXOS is a widely used 
modelling tool used for electricity market modelling and planning [e.g.  Gil (2012); Tomšic and 
Pašicko (2010); William E. et al. (2012)]. The Commission for Energy Regulation in the Republic 
of Ireland and the Utility Regulator in Northern Ireland have validated a PLEXOS model for use 
in simulating system marginal prices and other market outcomes in the SEM [SEMO (2011b)].  
PLEXOS is a flexible platform allowing user defined constraints. Importantly from a research 
perspective PLEXOS is a transparent model, which allows users to browse and verify the 
equations of the problem via a diagnostic tool.  PLEXOS co-optimises hydro, thermal, 
renewable, and reserve classes; and no heuristic or sequential approach is taken. Modelling is 
carried out using mixed integer linear programming that aims to minimize an objective 
function subject to the expected cost of electricity dispatch and a number of constraints. The 
objective function of the model includes operational costs, consisting of fuel costs and carbon 
costs; start-up costs, consisting of a fuel off-take and a start cost; penalty costs for un-served 
energy and for failing to meet reserve requirements. System level constraints consist of an 
energy balance equation ensuring supply (net pumping demand) meets regional demand at 
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each period. Water balance equations ensure water flow within pumped storage units is 
conserved and tracked. Constraints on unit operation include minimum and maximum 
generation, maximum and minimum up and down time and ramp up and down rates.  Start-
up/shutdown profiles and times are enforced via run-up rates, however for simplicity these 
are ignored in these market simulations. 
In chronological mode, PLEXOS solves for each period and maintains consistency across the 
full problem horizon.  Our scenarios use a model run with an optimisation length of one hour 
and period of one day with a horizon of one year, which entails 365 individual daily 
optimisations at a resolution of one hour each. To avoid issues with inter-temporal constraints 
(i.e. unit commitment of large units and storage end levels) at the simulation step boundaries, 
a ‘look ahead’ period is used. ‘Look ahead’ means that the optimiser is given information 
about what happens ahead of the period of optimisation, and then solves for this full period 
(i.e. simulation period + look ahead period). However, only results for the simulation period 
are retained. Pumped storage units are also optimized in the model. Within the model, 
maintenance schedules for generation units can be fixed exogenously if a known maintenance 
schedule is available, otherwise the model can determine an optimal maintenance schedule 
based on the annual maintenance rate and mean time to repair for each unit. The objective 
function of the maintenance scheduling formulation is to equalize the capacity reserves across 
all peak periods.  Random outages for units are calculated based on Monte Carlo simulations. 
Outages occur at random times throughout the year with frequency and severity defined by 
forced outage rate, mean time to repair and repair time distribution. At simulation run time, 
PLEXOS dynamically constructs the linear equations for the problem using AMMO1 software 
and a solver to solve the equations. Within the PLEXOS modelling tool, wind and other 
renewables are essentially treated as ‘free’ generation (i.e. the marginal cost is zero).  
The PLEXOS model solves for an exogenously given electricity demand.  We use energy 
demand equations from the ISus model to project electricity demand in the Republic of 
Ireland.  The ISus model is an environmental emissions simulation model [Lyons and Tol 
(2010)] and the energy demand equations are described in detail in di Cosmo and Hyland 
(2012).  PLEXOS and ISus scenarios are iterated until electricity price and demand reach 
equilibrium.  Without a demand model for electricity demand in either Northern Ireland or 
Great Britain we have assumed that electricity demand remains constant in both jurisdictions 
[National Grid (2012); SONI & EirGrid (2011)]. 
5. Policy Scenarios 
We use the PLEXOS model to investigate policy questions relevant to the electricity sector on 
the island of Ireland in relation to proposals to support the price of carbon both within the EU 
ETS and unilaterally by the UK through a carbon price floor.  Specifically we attempt to answer 
the following questions: 
• What is the effect of the CPF on electricity prices, electricity demand, emissions and 
carbon leakage? 
                                                          
1 AMMO performs a similar role in PLEXOS as other mathematical languages such as AIMMS, AMPL, or 
GAMS but is written exclusively for PLEXOS 
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• What is the effect of the EU’s proposal to ‘back load’ the auctioning of ETS 
allowances? 
• Should ROI consider implementing a CPF in response to the GB CPF? 
• How much do electricity transmission constraints add to emissions and costs? 
There is no single answer to these questions, as there are many compounding factors 
including: weather conditions, renewable energy generating capacity, fossil fuel mix in 
generation capacity, fuel prices, interconnection capacity, exchange rate volatility, and 
electricity demand.  To make the analysis tractable we make assumptions surrounding these 
issues, which enable the analysis to focus on the effects of climate policies on the electricity 
sector. 
The first simplifying assumption is that our analysis is for just one year.  In doing this it allows 
us to abstract from the effects of changes over time in the mix of generation capacity 
between fuels and renewable generation in both electricity markets.  It also allows us to 
assume as fixed the amount of interconnection capacity between ROI, NI and BETTA.  We 
picked 2016 as our year of analysis, as it is sufficiently close in the future that there are 
reasonable estimates of what generating capacity will exist in both the SEM and BETTA 
markets [National Grid (2012); SONI & EirGrid (2011)].  2016 is also the first year in which the 
Large Combustion Plant Directive (2001/80/EC) becomes effective for existing generation 
plants, which will have a significant effect in reducing coal-fired generation capacity in the 
BETTA market.  We also assume that coal power plants in BETTA are constrained at 38% of 
capacity as a consequence of the Large Combustion Plant Directive.  Power plant efficiencies 
also vary between SEM and BETTA.  Gas power plants are more efficient in SEM, whereas coal 
power plants are more efficient in BETTA, as shown by Table 1.  We use a constant set of 
assumptions on fossil fuel prices and sterling-euro exchange rates across the scenarios we 
run.  For fuel prices we use E3M-Lab (2012) projections for 2020, which are based on a 
stochastic world energy model, and we interpolate values for 2016, as show in Table 2.  The 
cost of gas is higher in SEM than in BETTA, as Ireland pays the transport costs to supply the 
gas from Great Britain. Coal is cheaper in SEM, as this fuel is imported directly to the deep 
water port at the main coal power plant (Moneypoint).  It is arguable that these price 
projections will be overtaken by developments in international energy markets, particularly 
related to shale gas, but for the purpose of this analysis these prices are sufficient to 
demonstrate the scale of the effects climate policies can have on electricity costs and 
emissions.   
We develop six scenario analyses to help answer these questions, which are summarised in 
Table 3.  Scenario 1, ‘Pre Q2 2013’ describes the policy situation in spring 2013 when the only 
price for carbon in electricity generation in ROI, NI and BETTA was that which prevailed under 
the EU-ETS.  The ETS allowance price fluctuated around €4 in spring 2013.  Point Carbon 
(2012) project an ETS price increasing to €5 in 2016 under an assumption of no policy change 
in the EU-ETS.  Beginning 1st April 2013 the CPF was implemented in BETTA for the electricity 
sector, with NI exempt.  We model this in scenario 2, ‘CPF in BETTA’, where the price of 
carbon dioxide in the BETTA market in 2016 will be approximately €27 (stg£21) HM Treasury 
(2011).  Scenario 2 is essentially the status quo in a policy context, with a carbon price floor 
applicable in BETTA and carbon priced through the ETS in the Republic and Northern Ireland.  
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Scenario 3, ‘CPF in NI & BETTA’ is used to examine the implications if the carbon price floor 
were to be extended to include Northern Ireland.  Through the design of the SEM a CPF in NI 
would directly increase electricity prices in ROI.  An implication of higher electricity prices in 
the SEM due to a CPF in NI is that electricity customers in ROI will be indirectly paying taxes to 
the UK Treasury.  A potential policy response in ROI would be to match the CPF in NI and 
BETTA.  Scenario 4, ‘CPF in SEM & BETTA’, examines the impact of introducing a CPF within 
both jurisdictions of the SEM at a rate equivalent to the BETTA CPF.  Scenario 5, ‘EU Back-
loading’ investigates the impact of one variant of the EU Commission’s proposal to postpone 
auctions for ETS allowances.  Under the EU proposal allowances will be held back from 
auction in the years 2013-2015 when demand for allowances is expected to remain very low.  
Point Carbon (2012) have projected ETS allowance prices under a number of ‘back-loading’ 
variants, the most radical of which assumes that the back-loaded allowances will be cancelled 
in 2019-2020.  Under such a scenario their projections for ETS allowance prices is €12 in 2016.  
The SEM is effectively two interconnected transmission networks in the Republic and 
Northern Ireland, which has transmission constraints.  Scenarios 1-5 all incorporate those 
transmission constraints.  Scenario 2unc, ‘Unconstrained’, relaxes these transmission 
constraints and allows us to examine the additional costs and emissions associated with the 
constrained North-South tie line. 
6. Results and Discussion 
A summary of scenario results on the SEM’s load, wholesale electricity price, total system 
cost, and emissions for each of the scenarios are presented in Table 4.2  Prior to discussing 
individual scenarios it should be noted that the results are conditional on the assumptions 
about fuel prices, generating plant efficiencies and electricity demand.  The analysis also 
assumes a low price elasticity of demand, and even though the system marginal price varies 
substantially across the scenarios the variation in load demand is relatively muted.  For 
example, the household sector’s price elasticity for electricity in ROI is estimated at -0.06 [di 
Cosmo and Hyland (2012)].  We compare differences in results across the scenario runs to 
help answer the policy questions posed earlier.   
What is the effect of the CPF on electricity prices, electricity demand, emissions and 
carbon leakage? 
With a carbon price floor equivalent to €27 in BETTA in 2016 compared to €5 throughout the 
ETS, equivalent generation technologies are cheaper within the SEM and will export into the 
BETTA market subject to interconnector constraints.  As generation within the SEM increases 
to supply additional exports to the BETTA market, the marginal dispatching plant during any 
trading period will change, which directly affects the system marginal price.  On an annual 
basis the effect of BETTA’s CPF is to increase the SEM’s system marginal price in 2016 from a 
projected €76.9/MWh to €78.7/MWh, as per scenarios 1 and 2 in Table 4.  This represents a 
projected 2.4% increase in price, as shown in Table 5.  Table 6 shows the projected 
percentage change in interconnection flows between the SEM and BETTA and also within the 
                                                          
2 The calculated wholesale electricity price is an annual load-weighted average.  
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SEM between ROI and NI.  The introduction of the CPF makes BETTA generators less 
competitive compared to the SEM and net exports of electricity from the SEM to the BETTA 
market increase by 154%.  While this represents a very large increase in projected exports to 
the BETTA market, the level of exports are constrained by the capacity of interconnection 
between the markets.   
The higher costs associated with the introduction of the carbon floor are only partially 
mitigated by the savings from the REFIT scheme.3  Under this scheme, wind plants are 
guaranteed a minimum price for each unit of electricity they generate. As described above, 
the introduction of the CPF will lead to higher prices and more exports from SEM to BETTA.  
This in turn will impact on the Irish wind generators in two ways. (i) price effect: the 
compensation payments paid to wind generators are linked to the system marginal price. The 
wind generators receive the compensation payment every period the system marginal price is 
lower than the guaranteed price. The introduction of the CPF raises the system marginal price 
in SEM and consequently payments to the wind generators will be not higher than in the 
scenario without the carbon floor. (ii) curtailment effect:  the introduction of the CPF in BETTA 
makes the exports from SEM to the UK market higher than in the pre Q2 2013 scenario; with 
higher demand, wind in SEM will be curtailed less frequently, as the electricity generated by 
the wind power plants will be exported to BETTA.  The calculated savings in REFIT payments 
associated with the adoption of the CPF in BETTA is 0.36% of total costs of €1808 million 
conditional on model assumptions.4  Under the ‘CPF in BETTA’ total SEM costs increase to 
€2004 million, an increase of 10.9%, therefore the savings associated with reduced REFIT 
payments to wind generators are more than offset by the rise in total costs. 
Electricity demand within Ireland remains practically unchanged due to the low price elasticity 
of demand but with prices 2.4% higher expenditure on electricity by Irish consumers will 
increase by a similar amount.  Another major effect of the CPF is the redistribution of 
emissions.  Greenhouse gas emissions in 2016 are projected to increase by 6.9% in the SEM 
with respect to the no policy change scenario, and by slightly more within the Republic of 
Ireland.  This projected outcome is contrary to HM Revenue & Customs (2013), which contend 
that the NI exemption would ensure that emissions in NI and ROI will not increase due to the 
CPF.  Emissions from the BETTA market are projected to decline by 2.8%.  In absolute terms 
the increase in emissions in the SEM is 50% of the change in emissions in BETTA. The decline 
in BETTA emissions is due to the displacement of carbon intensive generation with imports 
from the SEM.    But aggregate emissions within the EU-ETS will not decline so there is no 
beneficial improvement in global emissions.    
In our model, the reduction electricity generation in BETTA is compensated by a rise in 
generation within the SEM subject to interconnection constraints. The magnitude of these 
changes in generation may vary depending on the level of interconnection between BETTA 
and other markets.  As our model just considers the interconnection between SEM and 
BETTA, the increase in the carbon emissions in SEM should be taken as an upper bound 
                                                          
3 The Renewable Energy Feed in Tariff (REFIT) is the primary means through which electricity from 
renewable sources is supported in Ireland. 
4 In this scenario the reduction in REFIT payments entirely due to price effects with no reduction in 
payments due to curtailment effects. 
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estimate of the potential effects of the implementation of the UK CPF. However, if other 
markets are included in the analysis, carbon leakage from BETTA will be extended across 
Europe, and consequently impact on emission targets.5 
Without a demand model for BETTA’s electricity demand we have assumed that electricity 
demand in BETTA remains constant across all scenarios.  As anticipated a BETTA CPF results in 
a carbon leakage from the BETTA into the SEM market.  An outcome that was not anticipated 
is that the CPF results in an overall reduction in emissions from the combined SEM and BETTA 
markets of 1.2%. Table 7 reports emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalents per GWh 
generated (excluding transmissions losses), which shows that emissions intensity improves in 
all jurisdictions following the introduction of the CPF in BETTA in scenario 2.  While emissions 
intensity may improve there is no net reduction in EU or global emissions.    The improvement 
within the SEM is attributable to an economy of scale, with a larger system load due to 
increased exports generation plant is capable of operating at optimum efficiency for longer 
periods with less ramping cycles necessary.   
The model’s interconnection flows are determined by fuel and plant efficiency assumptions. 
Gas is frequently the marginal fuel both in SEM and BETTA. The low efficiency of GB gas 
power plants leads to higher shadow prices in BETTA than in SEM.  In Plexos the 
interconnection flows are driven by the shadow price and as result, in our model SEM is a net 
exporter.  This is not confirmed by historical data, as shown by Deane et al. (2013), which 
finds that BETTA prices are substantially lower than SEM prices for the period 2008-2011.  
Consequently the analysis here should be taken as an upper bound estimate of the potential 
effects on the interconnection flows.  It is difficult to model interconnector flows between the 
SEM and BETTA markets, as the rules on the operation and access to the interconnectors are 
quite complex [SEMO (2011a)].  Transmissions capacity auctions are persistently 
undersubscribed, and transmissions rights acquired are not fully used [McInerney and Bunn 
(2013)].  This occurs even though there are significant price differentials between the SEM 
and BETTA markets, as noted by Deane et al. (2013).  There are also significant power flows 
on the SEM-BETTA interconnectors against the efficient price spread direction, which 
McInerney and Bunn (2013) attribute to factors such as intermittent wind and strategic 
behaviour by dominant firms. 
Abstracting from the existing management of the interconnectors it is nonetheless interesting 
to analyse carbon emissions and exports based on the assumption of unhindered and free 
access to the interconnectors. Research by Malaguzzi Valeri (2009) on the SEM and BETTA 
markets in 2005 concluded that price integration between the two markets required a high 
level of interconnection but that the amount of interconnection necessary for integration 
decreases for high costs of carbon.  With a high price of carbon in the BETTA market less 
interconnector capacity may be required to move towards price integration.  In Table 8 we 
                                                          
5 Our model has assumed no interconnection between GB and Europe, as we do not model European 
electricity markets. To check the robustness of this assumption we incorporated a European node in 
the model based on past interconnector flows between BETTA and other European markets. This 
analysis suggested that excluding interconnection between GB and Europe does not significantly alter 
model results and conclusions. 
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report SEM and BETTA prices and changes in the interconnection with respect to the Pre Q1 
2013 scenario. The implementation of the CPF in BETTA increases the electricity price in the 
BETTA market by roughly €10/MWh reaching €81/MWh.  The flow on the market 
interconnectors increases by 154% and the gap between the BETTA and SEM price falls from 
€6/MWh to €2.3/MWh.  In several of the scenarios carbon is priced differently in the two 
markets but in the ‘Pre Q2 2013’ and ‘CPF in SEM & GB’ scenarios it is the same, €5 in the 
former and €27 in the latter.  The largest price difference between the two markets occurs 
under the ‘CPF in SEM & GB’ scenario.  In this scenario the CPF is applied both to BETTA and 
SEM, so the gap between the wholesale prices in these two markets is almost the same as 
under the ‘no policy change’ scenario.  
What is the effect of the EU’s proposal to ‘back load’ the auctioning of ETS 
allowances? 
The European Parliament is currently discussing the ‘back loading’ proposal as a support 
measure for the ETS’s allowance price [ENVI (2013)].  A major uncertainty surrounding the 
back-loading proposal is its effect on the ETS price.  The ‘back-loading’ scenario here assumes 
that the ETS price will rise to €12 in 2016.  This price is based on projections undertaken by 
Point Carbon (2012) on the basis of 700-900,000 ETS allowances held back from auction in the 
years 2013-2015 but subsequently cancelled in 2019-2020.  We limit our analysis of the effect 
of back-loading to the SEM and BETTA markets.  Given that the CPF has already been 
implemented in BETTA the effect of subsequently introducing a back-loading mechanism that 
increases the ETS price to €12 can be examined through the difference between the ‘CPF in 
BETTA’ and ‘EU Back-loading’ scenarios.  With the ETS price increasing from €5 to €12 the cost 
of electricity in the SEM increases by 1.2% and demand for electricity within the SEM slightly 
declines.  As the gap between the ETS price and the CPF narrows, electricity in the SEM is less 
price competitive compared to BETTA and interconnection flows to the BETTA market are less 
than under the ‘CPF in BETTA’ scenario.  Overall, net exports decline by 11%, though exports 
are still significantly above pre-CPF levels at +125%.  The effect on emissions varies between 
jurisdictions.  Combined SEM and BETTA emissions are practically unchanged compared to the 
‘CPF in BETTA’ scenario.  Emissions and emissions intensity decline in the SEM, while the 
reverse is the case in BETTA.  With total emissions from the SEM and BETTA combined 
unchanged compared to the ‘CPF in BETTA’ scenario one conclusion is that there is no 
additional climate benefit from implementing the back-loading proposal.  This would be a 
narrow interpretation as back-loading will affect electricity prices and emissions throughout 
the EU.  Specifically within the SEM the back-loading proposal reduces emissions by 2.3% in 
2016 compared to the ‘CPF in BETTA’ scenario.  Under the back-loading proposal the 
allowances will be auctioned in 2019-2020 so the initial reduction in emissions will not be 
permanent. 
Should ROI consider implementing a CPF in response to the BETTA CPF? 
As carbon leakage from BETTA to ROI will decrease Ireland’s efforts to move to a low carbon 
economy ROI authorities may consider implementing its own CPF.  The relative simplicity and 
the effectiveness of a CPF at reducing emissions compared to the EU-ETS are also potential 
benefits of a CPF.  Introducing a CPF in both jurisdictions of the SEM could lead to an increase 
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of 17.5% in the price of electricity in the SEM, which would result in a significant loss in 
competitiveness for firms exporting to continental Europe and further afield.  However, as a 
climate policy a CPF in the SEM would be quite effective with emissions projected to fall by 
15.9%, and by 17.3% in the ROI (but would have no effect on aggregate EU emissions).  It 
should be noted that the reduction in emissions in the SEM may be over-estimated in our 
model, as we do not consider interconnection between BETTA and the other EU electricity 
markets.  A CPF would also generate significant tax revenues.  Table 9 presents estimates of 
tax revenues associated with emissions arising in ROI and NI, which are conditional on the ETS 
price assumption as well as net export flows on the interconnectors to the BETTA market.  If a 
CPF is implemented in the SEM, taxes on emissions in NI will be remitted to the UK Treasury 
and taxes on emissions in ROI will be remitted to the Irish Treasury.  Because the SEM is a 
wholesale pool market with a single price, customers in both jurisdictions will effectively be 
paying the taxes to both treasuries.  In proportion to their relative share of total SEM demand 
ROI customers will remit €204 million in carbon tax payments to the Irish Treasury and a 
further €76 million to the UK Treasury.  The remittance by Irish customers to the UK Treasury 
is almost offset by remittances by Northern Ireland customers to the Irish Treasury.  Had 
electricity generators in NI not been exempt from the CPF (i.e. scenario ‘CPF in NI & BETTA’), 
customers from the ROI would pay approximately €65 million to the UK Treasury in 2016.  In 
the absence of the NI exemption this unilateral climate policy by the UK government had the 
potential to generate significant tax revenue from ROI and given the difficult state of Irish 
public finances would have posed an important justification for consideration of 
implementing a similar CPF in ROI.  A counter argument would have been the impact of 
significantly higher electricity prices on competitiveness. 
How much do electricity transmission constraints add to emissions and costs? 
Several studies recognize the importance of the construction of a second North-South tie line 
between NI and ROI, including CER (2012) and FitzGerald (2004). EirGrid is currently 
developing a second line to enhance the integrity of the systems, which will be operative from 
2017 [see SONI & EirGrid (2011)]. This will both ensure the security of supply in NI and allow 
the SEM generation system to dispatch efficiently. 
Because NI and ROI are two interconnected electricity systems both entirely in the same 
market they are an ideal case study for illustrating the benefits of developing sufficient 
interconnection capacity between markets.  We use the comparison between scenarios ‘CPF 
in BETTA’ and ‘Unconstrained’ to highlight the potential gains of greater transmission 
between NI and ROI.  The ‘CPF in BETTA’ scenario reflects actual transmission constraints 
between ROI and NI, whereas in the ‘Unconstrained’ scenario the second North-South tie line 
is assumed built and there is sufficient transmission capacity between NI and ROI.   
Investment in removing transmission constraints between NI and ROI has the potential to 
reduce the SEM’s total system cost by 1.5% and reduce NI emissions by 2.6%, as shown in the 
final row of Table 5.  There is a small reduction in emissions in the ROI.  With a transmission 
constraint in place NI generation plants, which are generally older and less efficient than ROI 
plants, are prioritised in the merit order to ensure that system demand within the NI network 
is met.  When the transmission constraints are relaxed more efficient power plants in the ROI 
can generate electricity for the whole SEM system.  With more efficient ROI plants displacing 
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NI plants in the merit order, the SEM’s system marginal price, determined by the marginal 
dispatching plant, will be lower.  The reduction in SEM’s costs totals €30 million, which results 
in a reduction of 0.9% in electricity price.   
The capital cost of an overhead second North-South tie line is roughly €81 million, which 
when compared to the reduced costs and emissions avoided that will recur on an annual basis 
means that the strengthening of transmission between NI and ROI is a worthwhile financial 
investment.6  Strengthening transmission within the SEM is a simple case-study of the 
benefits of market interconnection.  Interconnection is often discussed as a means to increase 
wind generation capacity on electricity networks [e.g. Denny et al. (2010)] but this analysis 
shows that there can be both financial benefits and reduced emissions independent of the 
level of wind generation capacity, which was held constant in this scenario analysis. 
Welfare Implications 
In the previous section we have analysed how emissions, prices, and costs change under 
different scenarios.  As expected, the scenario with the highest carbon prices (i.e. scenario 4 
‘CPF in SEM & BETTA’) has the greatest impact on emission reductions, with total emissions 
from SEM and BETTA combined falling by 1.4% to 107.4 million tonnes.  This was also the 
scenario under which the carbon intensity of electricity generation was lowest for the SEM 
and for the SEM and BETTA combined, as shown in Table 7.  A detailed analysis of the welfare 
implications driven by the rise of the electricity prices is beyond the scope of this paper but it 
is worth noting that there is likely to be a significant redistribution of welfare between 
electricity producers and consumers. 
In the case of a carbon tax or CPF, the tax is paid to government and there is a potential 
welfare loss if the tax revenue is not redistributed, as firms will face higher fuel prices and 
consumers will pay higher utility bills.  However, depending on how the tax revenue is used, 
for example for additional spending or to offset existing taxation, the welfare impacts will 
differ.  Conefrey et al. (2012) examine the effect of a carbon tax on the ROI economy and find 
that when the tax revenue is recycled through lower income taxes a double dividend is 
possible, yielding both a reduction in emissions and an improvement in economic 
performance.  But if, for example, the tax revenue is recycled as lump-sum transfers to 
households, the double dividend is unlikely to materialise and negative welfare impacts may 
be substantial.  Callan et al. (2008) and Verde and Tol (2009) have shown that carbon based 
taxes are regressive and unless supporting compensatory measures are instituted poorer 
households will be significantly impacted by the measure. 
If the CPF is only implemented in the BETTA market, electricity generators within the SEM are 
the beneficiaries of the increased electricity prices.  In that situation there is no additional tax 
revenue available to be recycled and policy responses, such as those discussed in Conefrey et 
al. (2012) and di Cosmo and Hyland (2011), to offset negative welfare impacts will not be 
feasible. The scale of the welfare losses are difficult to quantify. However, it is plausible that 
with carbon prices equal to €27, the industrial sectors in Ireland and UK will lose 
competitiveness with respect to their European partners.  
                                                          
6 We assume here that the N-S line is constructed overground. 
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7. Conclusions 
In April 2013 the UK implemented a unilateral climate policy that sets a floor for the price of 
carbon in the BETTA market, and which overrides the EU’s price mechanism for pricing carbon 
within Europe – the EU-ETS.  Northern Ireland (NI) was exempt from the CPF in recognition of 
energy security issues and to ensure that emissions in NI and ROI do not increase as a result of 
the introduction of the CPF [HM Revenue & Customs (2013)].  Using a simulation model of the 
SEM and BETTA electricity markets we investigated the effect of the CPF on electricity prices, 
interconnection, emissions and carbon leakage.  We find that the BETTA’s CPF has the 
potential to have significant spill-over into the SEM due to the interconnection between the 
SEM and the BETTA markets.  Our simulation projections for 2016 are that the CPF will result 
in the SEM electricity price increasing by 2.4% and emissions increasing in both NI and ROI by 
4.2% and 7.8% respectively, given our model assumptions.  The increase in SEM emissions is 
directly attributable to carbon leakage from the BETTA market, under the assumption of no 
interconnection between the GB and other European electricity markets.  An unanticipated 
result is that emissions from the SEM and BETTA markets combined declined by 1.2%.  This 
result is attributable to more efficient electricity generation across the two markets and 
excludes the demand impact of higher cost electricity in the BETTA market.  As the CPF does 
not affect the number of ETS allowances, any reduction in emissions in the SEM or BETTA 
markets will be offset by increased emissions elsewhere in Europe such that there is unlikely 
to be any change in aggregate European emissions. 
While the SEM market is not insulated from the impact of the CPF, we find that the decision 
to exempt NI from the CPF averts a peculiar situation where ROI electricity customers would, 
via NI electricity generators, remit approximately €65 million in CPF payments to the UK 
Treasury.  While the NI exemption precludes that situation arising, ROI electricity customers 
still face higher prices than would occur otherwise.  Electricity generators within the SEM, 
rather than government treasuries, are the beneficiaries of the higher prices.  Had the CPF 
been implemented in NI, projected emissions in ROI would have been even higher.  A 
potential policy response by ROI to the CPF was to implement its own CPF to prevent further 
carbon leakage and maintain ROI efforts to decarbonise the economy.  An ROI CPF similar to 
that in BETTA would raise tax revenues for the Irish Treasury of some €260 million, subject to 
scenario assumptions, which is not insignificant in the context of austerity budgets.  However, 
A CPF in ROI would significantly reduce business competitiveness and household welfare with 
electricity prices rising by roughly 17%. 
Security of electricity supply in NI is a significant issue [CER (2012)].  A second transmission 
line is currently being developed to enhance the integrity of NI and ROI systems, to ensure 
security of supply in NI, and allow the SEM generation system to dispatch more efficiently.  
The strengthening of transmission within the SEM is a simple case-study of the benefits of 
market interconnection.  The analysis shows that there can be both financial and 
environmental benefits from developing sufficient interconnection capacity, independent of 
any requirements to expand wind generation capacity on networks.   
Analysis of the welfare implications of climate policies was beyond the scope of this paper but 
it is important to note that policies, which have the potential to be quite effective from a 
climate perspective, such as the CPF, are also likely to have significant welfare impacts.  A 
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number of studies have suggested how the negative welfare impact can be minimised [Callan 
et al. (2008); Conefrey et al. (2012); Verde and Tol (2009)].  
 
 
Table 1: Power plant conversion efficiency, SEM and BETTA 
 
BETTA SEM 
Gas 0.54 0.56 
Coal 0.38 0.35 
 
 
Table 2: Fuel Price Assumptions, €/GJ, 2016 
  
BETTA SEM 
Gas Winter 10.45 10.52 
 




Coal   4.17 3.83 
 
 





ROI NI BETTA 
1 Pre Q2 2013 Yes ETS=€5 ETS=€5 ETS=€5 
2 CPF in BETTA Yes ETS=€5 ETS=€5 CPF=€27 (£21) 
2unc Unconstrained No ETS=€5 ETS=€5 CPF=€27 (£21) 
3 CPF in NI & BETTA Yes ETS=€5 CPF=€27 (£21) CPF=€27 (£21) 
4 CPF in SEM & BETTA Yes CPF=€27 (£21) CPF=€27 (£21) CPF=€27 (£21) 










































1 Pre Q1 2013 76.9 41.40 1808 13.6 4.9 18.5 91.7 110.3 
2 CPF in BETTA 78.7 41.40 2004 14.7 5.1 19.8 89.2 109.0 
2unc Unconstrained 78.0 41.45 1974 14.6 5.0 19.6 89.5 109.1 
3 CPF in NI & 
BETTA 
80.6 41.27 2086 15.2 3.9 19.0 89.7 108.7 
4 CPF in SEM & 
BETTA 
92.5 40.75 2199 12.2 4.5 16.7 90.8 107.4 
5 EU Back-loading 79.7 41.30 2051 14.1 5.2 19.4 89.6 108.9 
 


























1 to 2 2.4 0.0 10.9 7.8 4.2 6.9 -2.8 -1.2 
2 to 3 2.4 -0.3 4.1 3.1 -24.3 -3.9 0.6 -0.3 
1 to 5 3.6 -0.2 13.4 3.6 6.7 4.4 -2.3 -1.2 
2 to 5 1.2 -0.2 2.3 -4.0 2.4 -2.3 0.5 0.0 
3 to 4 14.7 -1.2 5.4 -19.8 16.4 -12.5 1.2 -1.2 
2 to 4 17.5 -1.6 9.7 -17.3 -11.8 -15.9 1.8 -1.4 





Table 6:  Percentage Change in interconnection flows between ROI, NI and BETTA markets 
Scenario ROI to GB ROI to NI NI to GB AI (ROI+NI) 
to GB 
1 vs 2 154 -538 153 154 
2 vs 3 -9 -449 -9 -9 
1 vs 5 124 -929 126 125 
2 vs 5 -12 89 -11 -11 
3 vs 4 -59 -95 -58 -59 
2 vs 4 -63 -117 -61 -62 
2 to 2unc 9 290 7 8 
 
 
Table 7: Tonnes CO2 per GWh generated 
Scenario ROI NI SEM BETTA SEM+BETTA 
1 Pre Q2 2013 409 481 426 284 301 
2 CPF in BETTA 406 478 423 279 297 
2unc Unconstrained 406 479 422 280 298 
3 CPF in NI & BETTA 405 438 412 280 297 
4 CPF in SEM & BETTA 371 447 389 281 294 











Δ in price 
(€/MWh) 
Net Exports 
(Scenario 1 = 100) 







1 Pre Q2 2013 76.9 70.9 6.0 100 100 100 
2 CPF in BETTA 78.7 81.0 -2.3 254 254 253 
2unc Unconstrained 78.0 81.0 -3.0 235 234 236 
3 CPF in NI & BETTA 80.6 80.5 0.1 231 231 231 
4 CPF in SEM & BETTA 92.5 80.4 12.1 96 94 98 
5 EU Back-loading 79.7 80.5 -0.9 225 224 226 
 
 
Table 9:  Carbon Price Floor tax remittances, € million 
Scenario To Irish Treasury To UK Treasury 
    ROI NI ROI NI 
3 CPF in NI & BETTA     65 20 
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